Known Issues & Pipeline
A public list of what we already know about, so researchers do not spend their time rediscovering it and we do not spend ours re-triaging it.
Last updated: November 2026 | Network stage: Public beta testnet
If something you have found appears below, it is already tracked — you are welcome to tell us anyway, but expect it to be closed as a duplicate. If it does not appear below, we want to hear about it: security@vexidus.com.
Known and intentional on testnet
These are deliberate configurations of the public beta testnet. They are not defects, and they do not carry to mainnet.
| Area | Testnet behaviour | Mainnet |
|---|---|---|
| Token / test assets | No value, freely obtainable via faucet | N/A |
| Chain reset | The testnet has been reset before and may be again | Never |
| Inbound bridge deposits | Paused since 31 October 2026 while deposit attestation moves to an attester quorum | Planned: no bridge-minted tokens; VexBridge verifies foreign-chain events through the attester quorum. See VexBridge |
Recently resolved
| Area | Status |
|---|---|
| Transaction signatures | Enforced on every validator since 31 October 2026. Unsigned transactions are refused, including the convenience write methods that built a transaction on the node. An unsigned path that existed for testnet convenience was abused, so it was removed network-wide. See Testnet Security Model |
| System account as sender | Transactions naming the reserved system account as sender are refused at the RPC |
| Client-side signing across our apps | Complete. Every first-party surface — wallet, DEX, forge, governance, naming, logistics and the CLI — builds and signs transactions client-side |
| Account key visibility | vex_getAccount returns an account's registered signing keys, so key state is verifiable from outside a node |
Known and being worked on
Work already identified and in the pipeline. Listed so you know it is not news to us.
| Area | Status |
|---|---|
| Signature scheme migration | Canonical signatures accepted since block 18,700,000; legacy signatures are refused from block 33,000,000. Current CLI, SDKs and VexSpark sign canonical by default — older builds must be updated before that height |
| Atomence settlement rules | Registered market makers, a 1-hour settle deadline with guaranteed refund, and settlement proven by an attester quorum — activating at block 30,655,525. See Atomence |
| Cross-chain model for mainnet | Adopted policy: nothing comes to Vextaris that can't leave. Planned for mainnet — no unbacked bridged copies of foreign tokens; major assets reach Vextaris through escrowed Atomence swaps; stablecoins only from chartered issuers |
| Independent attester operators | Five attesters run on five separate machines on testnet today; independent outside operators are planned before mainnet |
| Rate limiting and request-shaping on public RPC | Batch-request capping is deployed; broader request-shaping remains tracked |
| TLS on direct validator RPC endpoints | Tracked for mainnet. On testnet every transaction is public on the explorer anyway |
| Email authentication (DMARC enforcement) | Tracked |
Out of scope
Reported often, and closed every time:
- Public ledger data described as "exposed" — validator sets, stakes, commissions, rewards, tokenomics splits, bridge fee schedules and jail policy are public by design. A blockchain cannot function otherwise. Reporting them as a disclosure vulnerability reflects a misunderstanding of the system rather than a finding.
- Verbose RPC error messages — intentional developer ergonomics on a developer-facing RPC. Everything they reveal is already public in our SDK and client version string.
- Missing security headers on marketing pages, absent a demonstrated impact.
- Automated scanner output with no demonstrated impact on this system specifically.
What we especially want
- Anything that lets one participant take another's assets — signatures are enforced on testnet now, so a transaction executed without the sender's valid signature is a real finding.
- Consensus safety: two honest nodes persuaded to disagree on a committed block.
- Key handling: recovery, rotation, delegation or multi-signature flows that can be subverted by someone who should not be able to.
- Anything where our public documentation is wrong about what the system does. The gap that once produced five duplicate reports was exactly this, and we would rather hear about the next one early.
How we handle reports
We verify every report ourselves, against our own systems, before assessing it — never from a link or attachment supplied with the report. We aim to tell you plainly whether a finding is new, a duplicate, or not a finding, and why.
There is no paid bounty programme at this time and we will not imply that there is. Reports are triaged and recorded; if a programme opens, earlier reports are revisited for eligibility, with credit to whoever reported first.